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THE DEAD MAN'S STATUTE- A RELIC OF THE PASTt
by
Roy R. Ray*
N Texas we have a statute which is popularly known as the
Dead Man's Statute.' Most lawyers at one time or another have
had occasion to invoke it or have it enforced against them. Law-
yers and judges alike will agree that its interpretation is sur-
rounded with much uncertainty, and a vast number will admit
that its application has been the source of many injustices. For
a perspective from which to view the statute a brief historical
statement will be helpful.
As students of evidence know, the English Common Law dis-
qualified all parties to a suit from giving testimony. The rule
came into existence around 1500 and prevailed for over four
hundred years. The general theory of disqualification was this:
the best method of securing the truth is to exclude certain classes
of witnesses who are apt to speak falsely. One such group is
persons who have a primary interest in the event of the action.
Therefore they should be excluded. Professor Wigmore gave the
perfect answer to this reasoning by stating that both of the prem-
ises of the syllogism are unsound: first, that pecuniary interest
does not make it probable that the party will commit perjury,
and second, even if it did, the risks of false decisions are not best
avoided by excluding such testimony. Jeremy Bentham made a
determined attack upon this disqualification in his great work
on Evidence published in 1827, and public opinion was gradually
changed until it was finally believed that truth would be better
ascertained and justice administered by doing away with the dis-
qualification. In 1843 and 1851 statutes were enacted in England
accomplishing this result. Within a few years this reform had
spread to most of our states. The change in Texas came in 1871
by a staute which is now Article 3714, TEX. REV. CiV. STAT.
(1925). It reads: "No person shall be incompetent to testify on
t The substance of this paper has been used as an address before the Dallas and
Tyler Bar Associations.
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1 TEx. REV. Cxv. STAT. (1925), art. 3716.
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account of color, nor because he is a party to a suit or proceeding
or interested in the issue to be tried."
At the same time and by the same act which removed the dis-
qualification by interest, Texas set up an exception in case of
testimony as to transactions with decedents. In this respect the
common-law disqualification of interested parties was retained.
The text of the statute (now Article 3716, TEx. REV. CiV. STAT.
(1925)) reads as follows:
In actions by or against executors, administrators, or guardians, in
which judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, neither
party shall be allowed to testify against the others as to any trans-
action with, or statement by the testator, intestate or ward, unless
called to testify thereto by the opposite party; and the provisions of
this article shall extend to and include all actions by or against
the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent arising out of any
transactions with such decedent. 2
It is not the purpose here to discuss the interpretation of the
statute in all its ramifications.' Space limitations alone would
prevent this. But this article will attempt to show that the Dead
Man's Statute is not the best remedy for the supposed disease
and to point out the dangers of injustice which come from exclud-
ing in these cases all interested parties. A doctor may not in a
suit against the patient's estate testify to visits he has made or the
treatment given.4 A surgeon suing decedent's administrator for
his fee may not testify to the performance of an operation.5 One
2 For statements as to the purpose of statute see, Mores v. Wills, 67 Tex. 109, 5
S.W. 675, 676 (1887) ; Whatley v. Whatley, 169 S.W.2d 989 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943);
Kamp v. Harvis Bldg. Co., 238 S.W.2d 277 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943) error rel. n.r.e.
In Scott v. McKibban, 110 S.W.2d 72, 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) the court sets forth
five conditions which must be met before a witness will be declared incompetent
under the statute. The statute is not applicable to criminal prosecutions. Green v.
State, 153 Tex. Crim. 442, 221 S.W.2d 612 (1949).
3 Detailed treatment of the application of the statute and its interpretation by
the courts is found in MCCORMICK AND RAY, TEXAs LAW OF EVIDENCE §§325-336
(2d ed. 1956). The courts have repeatedly stated that the statute is to be strictly
construed and its terms not extended by judicial construction. McCoRMICK AND
RAY, op. cit. supra, §324, note 31. But they appear to have given only lip service to
the principle of strict construction. For examples of what appear to be clearly unwar-
ranted judicial extensions, see Holland v. Nimitz, infra note 9; International Traveler's
Insurance Ass'n v. Bettis, infra note 11, Andreades v. McMillan, infra note 12, and
Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, infra note 8.
4 Garwood v. Schlichenmaier, 60 S.W. 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901).




who claims to be a creditor for moneys advanced to a decedent'
or for goods sold to him7 may not testify as to those transactions.
In a will contest on the grounds of insanity the interested mem-
bers of the family who would naturally know most about the
mental capacity of the decedent are barred from giving their
knowledge to the jury.' And the Supreme Court has gone so far
as to hold that the evidence is not admissible even though it is
based solely on the witness's observation of the acts and conduct
of the testator and is not in any way the result of conversation
with or statements by the testator.! Moreover, when third persons
not interested in the estate have testified that one of the family,
taking under the will, has used undue influence, that party is
barred from taking the stand and denying the claimed wrong-
doing.1 Surely this is most unfair.
One of the most glaring instances of extreme and unjust hard-
ship imposed by the statute, not upon some outside claimant, but
upon the dead man's kin whom he sought to protect, is illustrated
by the case of International Travelers Insurance Assn. v. Bettis."
In this case Mr. Bettis, a rancher, had purchased an accident
insurance policy which was payable to his estate. While the policy
was in force Mr. Bettis died of blood poisoning resulting from
an injury to his finger, and his administrator sued on the policy.
To prove the accident, a son of Mr. Bettis, who was one of his
heirs, testified that he and his father, by themselves, a few days
before his father's death were tightening the wire upon a pasture
fence, and that while they were working the wire slipped and
a barb caught his father's hand, causing the injury which later
became fatally infected. The Supreme Court in reversing the
lower courts, held that under our statute the son, the only eye-
6 Madero v. Calzado, 281 S.W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926).
7Horlock v. Guardian Trust Co., 274 S.W. 204 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
8 Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 142 Tex. 476, 179 S.W.2d 291 (1944). This is one of the
leading cases and the opinion is devoted to a discussion and interpretation of the
statute. It also emphasizes the rule that the party seeking to get the evidence in may
not put before the jury the fact of reliance upon the statute by the other party.
s Holland v. Nimitz, 111 Tex. 419, 232 S.W. 298 (1922). (Proceeding to contest
probate of a will. Evidence by daughter and heir of testatrix, that from observation of
her acts, conduct and mental and physical condition, she was of the opinion that
testatrix was insane at time of making will, excluded).
10 Harris v. Harris' Estate, 276 S.W. 964 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). See also Holland
v. Nimitz, supra note 9.
It 120 Tex. 67, 35 S.W.2d 1040 (1931), reversing the Dallas Court ol Civil Appeals,
3 S.W.2d 478 (1928).
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witness to the accident, was disqualified, since this was a trans-
action with the decedent. This appears to be an unwarranted
judicial extension of the phrase "transaction with" far beyond
what the legislature could have intended.
In recent years the disqualification under the statute has been
extended to a suit for personal injuries arising out of an automo-
bile collision, brought by the survivor against the estate of the
person killed. In Andreades v. McMillan,2 Michael Andreades
sued the administrator of Charles Cummings, deceased, for dam-
ages arising out of personal injuries to himself and wife as the
result of a collision between an automobile driven by plaintiff
and one driven by the deceased. The trial court refused to allow
plaintiff Andreades to testify as to the facts, circumstances and
occurrences surrounding the collision, and made a similar ruling
with respect to plaintiff's wife. If Andreades was disqualified so
was his wife, since she is considered an interested party. The
El Paso Court of Civil Appeals reluctantly affirmed the lower
court decision on the ground that it felt bound by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the statute in the Bettis and other cases.
Most of the opinion, however, was devoted to quotations from
text writers and law review aricles, criticizing the Dead Man's
Statute, and it is clear that the court was not in sympathy with
the statute. It said, "It is difficult to explain either the source or
the reasoning behind this statute."' 8 Further, the court said, "while
we here have some grave doubts that the judicial extension of
Art. 3716 as set forth in Holland v. Nimitz ought to include the
facts of the case at bar, we feel constrained by the language of
the above cases to so hold."' 4 Of course, the writer is prejudiced
in favor of these two statements since the court quoted extensively
from his own words.15 This extension of the statute's application
to personal injury suits arising out of automobile collisions can
only add to the range of possible injustices.
The reason usually offered in support of the statute is that to
permit survivors to testify would place in peril the estates of the
dead. The remedy given by the statute is to close the mouths of all
12 252 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953).
13Id. at 478.
4Id. at 480.
15 MCCORMICK AND RAY, TExAs LAW OF EVIENCE 226,, 241 (1st ed. 1937).
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surviving parties who are interested on behalf of the estate or
against it. It is believed that this remedy is too drastic and that
it does more harm than good. Admitting that there is some danger,
as there always is when a vital witness is unavailable, that in-
justice may be done by reason of false claims against the estate,
what is the best remedy? The estates of the living are endangered
by the present rule which bars from proof honest claims. It is
surely not more important to save dead men's estates from false
claims than to save living men's estates from loss by lack of proof.
The present statute seems open to all of the objections which
were successfully urged against the interest disqualification in
general. This incompetency has been severely condemned by lead-
ing writers. Thirty-five years ago a prominent member of the New
York Bar said:
This restriction not infrequently works intolerable hardship in pre-
venting the establishment of a meritorious claim. Furthermore, it has
been enforced with the most rigorous literalness and has been the
occasion of a labyrinth of subtle decisions. A long experience leads me
to believe that the evils guarded against do not justify the retention of
the rule. In the early development of our jurisprudence the testimony
of all interested witnesses was excluded; but experience gradually led
to the conclusion that the restriction should be relaxed and more
reliance should be placed upon the efficacy of our process of investi-
gating truth. Cross-examination, for instance, has been found to be
well calculated to uncover a fraudulent scheme concocted by an
interested party; and where that has failed, the scrutiny to which the
testimony of a witness is subjected by the court and by the jury, has
proven efficacious in discovering the truth, to say nothing of the power
of circumstantial evidence to discredit the mere oral statement of an
interested witness. 16
In 1927 an experienced Texas trial lawyer made the follow-
ing indictment of our statute:
(1) It prevents recovery of just debts from the estate of decedent
debtors. If the number of honest men is greater than the number of
dishonest men, the number of honest claims against decedents is likely
to be greater than the number of dishonest claims. A statute which
closes the mouth of honest and dishonest claimants alike does more
harm than good. especially in view of the fact that the dishonest
claimant, if allowed to testify, is likely to be defeated anyhow. (2) The
16 Taft, Comments on Will Contests in New York, 30 YALE L. J. 593, 605 (1921).
[Vol. i0
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time consumed in applying and interpreting the statute is out of all
proportion to the doubtful good it does. A statute so difficult of definite
limitation should be one of undoubted desirability before it is justified.
The statute cannot meet this test. (3) It has so befogged our decisions
that the Courts and the Bar do not yet know the limitations of the rule.17
Wigmore, the greatest of our evidence scholars, uttered this
scathing denunciation of the rule:
As a matter of policy, this survival of a part of the now discarded
interest-disqualification is deplorable in every respect; for it is based
on a fallacious and exploded principle, it leads to as much or more
false decision than it prevents and it encumbers the profession with a
profuse mass of barren quibbles over the interpretation of mere words.' 8
In addition to the injustices which it imposes, the Dead Man's
Statute burdens the parties with uncertainties and appeals. For
almost three-quarters of a century our courts have been struggling
with the interpretation of this statute. With what result? A laby-
rinth of decisions which has brought confusion rather than clarity.
If you will consult VERNON'S ANNOTATED CIVIL STATUTES (which
does not include all the decisions) you will find some fifty col-
umns of fine print annotations under Article 3716. At about eight
points or paragraphs to a column this means about four hundred
points decided. Some three-fifths of these have been decided since
1926.
What, then, is the solution? In Texas there is a Committee for
the Improvement of the Law of Evidence, the membership of
which includes the evidence teachers in the various law schools
and distinguished lawyers and judges. This group has proposed
several worth-while improvements in the law of evidence. In 1951
three of its proposals were enacted by the Legislature; i.e.,
Business Records Act, Official Records Act, and the Simultaneous
Death Act.'9 In 1953 the Committee proposed a modification of
Article 3716. The bill was reported favorably by the House
Judiciary Committee after a thorough hearing, but it had a high
number and it was never reached on the House Calendar.
17 Cheek, Testimony as to Transactions with Decedents, 5 TEXAs L. REv. 149, 172
(1927).
18 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §578 (3d ed. 1940).
19 For a dicussion of these statutes see Ray, Three New Rules of Evidence, 5 Sw.
L. J. 381 (1951).
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The text of the suggested statute is as follows:
Section 1. In actions by or against executors or administrators, in
which judgment may be rendered for or against them as such, and in
all actions by or against the heirs or legal representatives of a decedent
arising out of any transaction with such decedent, the following
provisions shall apply:
(a) Either party if otherwise qualified shall be competent to testify;
(b) If any party shall testify to any transaction with or statement
by the decedent, any adverse party may prove the statements, oral or
written, of the decedent, relevant to the matters in issue, as evidence
of the facts stated;
(c) In passing on the credibility of the testimony of a party as to
any transaction with or statement by the decedent, his interest shall
be considered, and if his testimony though uncontradicted is not satis-
factory and convincing, the court or jury shall not be bound to find
in accordance therewith, and in a case tried to a jury the jury shall
be instructed as provided in this paragraph.
Section 2. This act shall be applicable only to actions instituted
after its effective date.
The proposed modification of Article 3716 would make all
interested parties competent to testify in suits involving trans-
actions with deceased persons, just as they are in all other suits.
This means that the main resources for exposing false testimony
available in all cases would be relied on here. These are, of course,
the bringing of honest witnesses when they are available to counter
the false with the true, and secondly, the test of cross-examination
by.which fraud and perjury can so often be exposed.
But the present bill provides additional safeguards.
First, if one of the parties testifies to a transaction with the
deceased, this opens the door to the other parties who would
usually be those defending the interest of the estate, to introduce
evidence of statements made by the deceased in his lifetime, as
evidence of the facts stated, thus making him a witness for him-
self from the grave. If someone claimed an oral contract or
payment, what the deceased wrote or said about the matter would
give his version to the court. This would often be an effective
answer to false claims.
Second, it provides that the jury will be told that in passing
[Vol. 10
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on the credibility of the testimony of an interested party they
shall consider his interest in weighing his evidence.
Third, the judge will explain to the jury that if his testimony
though uncontradicted is not satisfactory and convincing to them
they shall not be bound to find in accordance therewith.
It is believed that these provisions open the door to honest
witnesses now barred, and as to dishonest ones, provide reason-
able protection. The average Texas jury will be inclined to view
with great caution the testimony of a party-witness to a transaction
with one now dead, when he is not supported by other witnesses.
The provisions of this act insure that the jury's attention will be
called to the need of such action.
The proposed statute omits any reference to suits involving
guardians of infants and insane persons, which are included in
the provisions of the existing Article 3716. This omission is made
because of the relative infrequency with which questions about
competency of parties arise in respect to actions by or against
guardians, because of the need for simplicity, and because to
omit them will permit parties in such suits to testify under Article
3714, which is probably the most satisfactory disposition.
In connection with such a proposal for reform it is well to look
to the experience of other states. Nine states, including Louisiana,
New Mexico, Virginia, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hamp-
shire, Oregon, Rhode Island and Arizona, and one territory,
Alaska, have abolished or never had the disqualification of parties
to testify in these cases. In other words, they have rejected the
restrictions of the Dead Man's Statute. There are three types of
statutes. In New Mexico, Oregon and Virginia the testimony is
received but no recovery is permitted in such cases on the party's
testimony alone without some sort of corroboration. Connecticut,
Virginia and Oregon also receive any extant writings or declara-
tions of the decedent along with the testimony of the survivor.
New Hampshire and Arizona exclude the testimony except where
the court thinks that injustice may be done unless the testimony
of the party be received. A thorough study of these interested
survivor statutes and their practical workings was made by the
Legal Research Committee of the Commonwealth Fund. Its report
contains a masterly discussion of the subject and the need for
1956]
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reform.2" The committee concluded that both theory and experi-
ence justified the abolition of the rule disqualifying an interested
survivor and the establishment of a rule making all relevant
statements of the decedent admissible. They recommended the
enactment of a statute to accomplish this result.21
Among the statutes abrogating the disqualification of the sur-
vivor of a transaction with a decedent the oldest and most
approved is the Connecticut statute. It was studied by a committee
which submitted a questionnaire to the profession in that state.
The questionnaire asked the Connecticut lawyers and judges
whether in their experience this rule caused injustice, or aided in
the ascertainment of truth. Two hundred answers from persons
having had trial experience with the statute gave the following
percentages in favor of the statute: higher court judges, 89%;
practitioners with some experience, 60%; practitioners having
experience in six or more cases, 84%. In 1937-38 the American
Bar Association Committee on the Improvement of the Law of
Evidence (consisting of three judges, one practitioner, and Mr.
Wigmore, chairman, and advised by a group of 65 lawyers from
all the states) recommended the adoption of the Connecticut
statute. The members were unanimous and the advisors voted 46
to 3 in favor of the statute. This statute with some changes and
additions has served as the basis for the proposed modification
of Article 3716.
It is believed that the proposed changes in Article 3716 have
the great practical advantage of being easily understood and
administered. Moreover, this writer feels that they will aid in the
ascertainment of truth and at the same time provide sufficient
20 COMMONWEALTH FUND, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE-SOME PROPOSALS FOR ITS REFORM
22-25 (1927).
21 The text of the proposed statute is:
"No person shall be disqualified as a witness in any action, suit or proceeding by
reason of his interest in the event of the same as a party or otherwise.
"In actions, suits or proceedings by or against the representatives of deceased
persons, including proceedings for the probate of wills, any statement of the deceased
whether oral or written, shall not be excluded as hearsay provided that the trial judge
shall first find as a fact that the statement was made in good faith and on decedent's
personal knowledge."
For an account of recent legislative changes which tend to eliminate the statutory
disqualification of the Dead Man's Statute see 23 Wis. L. REv. 491, 495 (1948).
The Model Code of Evidence of the American Law Institute sweeps away all dis-
qualifications of witnesses, including that of the survivor of a transaction with a
decedent. Rule 101. For a discussion see McCormick, The New Code of Evidence of the
American Law Institute, 20 TExAs L. REv. 661 at 665 (1942).
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safeguards without disqualifying the survivor. It is expected that
proposed legislation will again be presented to the 1957 Legisla-
ture and it is hoped that the lawyers of Texas will actively support
this needed improvement in our jurisprudence.
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